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Secure Wireless Mobile Multicast Networks 
Trust T. Mapoka, Yousef. A.S. Dama, Haider M. AlSabbagh, Simon J. Shepherd, Raed A. Abd-
Alhameed                              
Abstract—Recently there is high demand in distributing multimedia services over the internet to ubiquitous and computational 
intelligent mobile subscribers by the service providers (SPs). In this instance, provision of those services must be restricted to 
authorized subscribers via integration of authentication and group key management (GKM). GKM with diverse group services 
subscribed dynamically by moving subscribers in wireless networks has been omitted in conventional approaches. However it is 
expected that significant key management overhead will arise in them due to multi-services co-existing in the same network. In 
this paper, we propose a scalable decentralized multi-service GKM scheme considering host mobility in wireless environment. 
In the scheme, authentication of mobile subscribers and key management phases are delegated from the trusted domain key 
distributor (DKD) to the subgroup controllers known as area key distributors (AKD). The trusted intermediate AKDs can then 
establish and distribute the service group keys to valid subscribers in a distributed manner using identity-based encryption 
without involving the domain key distributor (DKD). This alleviates unnecessary delays and possible bottlenecks at the DKD. We 
show by simulation that the proposed scheme has some unique scalability properties over known schemes in terms of 
optimized rekeying communication and storage overheads. The security performance studies have shown resilience to various 
attacks.  
Index Terms—Multicast communication; multi-service group key management, wireless mobile multicast networks 
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1 INTRODUCTION
he existing GKM protocols for wired approach as in 
[1] focus on generating keys and rekeying with dy-
namic group members. They are divided into central-
ized, decentralized and contributory [1]. Centralized 
schemes rely on the centralized server known as the DKD 
which is a single point of failure for key generation and 
distribution. Contributory scheme allow group members 
to cooperate for group key establishment without the 
DKD involvement. Decentralized schemes partition the 
group into subgroups each controlled by subgroup con-
trollers to equally distribute the key management tasks 
hence scalability. Work in [2] further categorizes the GKM 
as common TEK and independent TEK per subgroup ap-
proaches depending on the TEK distribution in the 
framework. Common TEK approaches such as in [3-5] 
utilize one TEK for all group members and commonly 
suffer from 1-affect-n phenomenon; thus rekeying of the 
new TEK disturbs members in the entire network when-
ever a membership change occurs. Independent TEK per 
subgroup alleviate the 1-affect-n phenomenon caused by 
common TEK approaches such as in [6], by enabling each 
subgroup to manage its own TEK, thus rekeying of the 
new TEK is localized within the affected subgroup during 
membership change. However the GKM protocols do not 
consider rekeying on host mobility on their implementa-
tion which is the focus of this paper. 
On the other hand, the existing GKM protocols for 
wireless mobile approach such as [7-10] focus on generat-
ing keys and rekeying with dynamic movements of sub-
scribers. The protocols adopt decentralized framework for 
scalability. Work in [11] also categorized them according 
to common TEK [7-9] and independent TEK per sub-
group [10] approaches as described in [2] to address simi-
lar rekeying issues. However, both the GKM approaches 
address access control in a single service. In these ap-
proaches, all the subscribers have same level of access 
privilege which enables them full access to the subscribed 
service if the decryption key is valid or deny access for an 
invalid decryption key. However, multi-service oriented 
GKM schemes may focus on multilevel access privileges 
which could complicate key management. Thus mobile 
subscribers may subscribe to various multiple services 
while moving and decrypt them with their keys. Several 
group oriented applications such as video conferencing, 
pay-per-view sports channels, and multi-stream mobile 
TV events may co-exist in the same evolving wireless 
networks. This would require an efficient GKM scheme 
for securing those service streams. 
In this paper, we introduce a new scalable session 
key distribution list (SKDL) concept to our earlier  multi-
service GKM scheme for wireless mobile networks intro-
duced in [12]. The new concept offers the following bene-
fits over the previously proposed schemes; 
 Move the authentication of individual mobile re-
ceivers from the DKD to the area intermediate 
trusted key distributor AKD. This alleviates un-
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necessary delays and possible bottlenecks at the 
DKD in large distributed multicast network in-
volving several services. 
 Reduce the rekeying traffic between the AKDs and 
DKDs which is replaced by the traffic to the SP, 
which needs to be notified of each rekeying. 
 Allow the intermediate trusted AKDs to establish 
and securely distribute the service encryption keys 
for affected services due to host mobility/handoff. 
This is done in a scalable manner without involv-
ing the trusted DKD. In fact rekeying is handled 
locally to alleviate 1-affect-n phenomenon and re-
duce communication overheads.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
details the new scalable multi-service concept while Sec-
tion 3 details the performance and security analysis of the 
new scheme against the related work. A conclusion is 
drawn in Section 4. 
 
2 A NEW SCALABLE MULTI-SERVICE GKM SCHEME 
In this section, a decentralized multi-service GKM 
scheme known as scalable multi-service GKM (SMGKM) 
scheme is presented. The authentication and key man-
agement phases of the system are both delegated securely 
from the trusted DKD to the intermediate AKDs. 
2.1 Multi-service system Description  
Suppose the mobile subscribers are subscribed to n 
services provided by the SP denoted as (s1, s2… sn). For 
simplicity, assume the SP is collocated with the DKD and 
can act as the DKD. We also assume that the SP has se-
cure channels already established to distribute the ser-
vices securely to the subscribers.. All mobile subscribers 
subscribing to the same set of services form a service 
group (SG) denoted as (G1, G2, …GK) where K is the num-
ber of SGs. This means that there can be K≤ 2n-1 possible 
SGs due to overlapping memberships. For example, if the 
system consists of various related services such as voice 
(s1), sports (s2), movie (s3), music (s4), stock quote (s5) and 
email (s6) as illustrated in Fig 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The corresponding SGs are G1 access (s1, s2), G2 access 
(s2, s3), G3 access (s2, s3, s4), G4 access (s3, s4), G5 access (s4, 
s5, s6) and G6 access (s5, s6). In this case subscribers may 
join, leave or switch service groups dynamically or may 
dynamically handoff between different administrative 
domains while maintaining their service groups. This also 
requires authentication of mobile subscribers whenever 
they cross different domains. 
2.2 System Initial Setup  
The entire system assumes trusted computing. It is a 
decentralized framework similar to [7, 8] with AKDs op-
erating under the jurisdiction of the trusted DKD. The 
mobile subscribers Mi which are under the jurisdiction of 
the trusted AKDs access their subscribed services wire-
lessly. Initially, the DKD setup the necessary system pa-
rameters that are delegated to the intermediate AKDs for 
use during the lifetime of our multi-group service orient-
ed approach. Thus the DKD selects the following parame-
ters: 
 Large prime p= 2q+1, where q is also primitive, 
 An additive cyclic group ॳ	1 and multiplicative 
cyclic group ॳ	2 both with order p. 
 Numbers P, Q ∈ ॳ	1 
 Two strong one way hash functions H1 : 
ॳ	2×ℤp→ ℤp and H2 : ॳ	2×ℤp→ {0, 1}*and H3 : {0, 
1}*→ {0, 1}*. 
 Master secret parameter s ∈ ℤp and master pub-
lic authentication key sP, denoted as (AKi). 
Generally given the cyclic groups ॳ	1 and ॳ	2, let ê : 
ॳ	1×ॳ	1 → ॳ	2 be an admissible bilinear map if ê(aP, bQ) = 
ê(P, Q)ab ∀P, Q ∈ ॳ	1 and ∀a, b ∈ ℤp and non-
degenerative if ê (P, P)≠1 for the generator P ∈ ॳ	1. There-
fore the DKD uses any efficient and computable non-
degenerate bilinear map ê: ॳ	1×ॳ	1 → ॳ	2 between the two 
cyclic groups, ॳ	1 and ॳ	2, provided the Diffie Hellman 
Problem (DHP) in ॳ	1 is infeasible. Other possible practi-
cally efficient and computable non degenerate bilinear 
maps include Weil pairing [13] and Tate pairing [14] on 
elliptic curve. During the initial registration phase every 
mobile Mi in the network receives the master secret pa-
rameter s and the long term public authentication key 
(AKi) common to all registered subscribers. The DKD also 
derives the Mi private session keys (SKMi_AKDi) per AKDi 
from s and AKDi identity IDAKDi ∈ ॳ	2 as sIDAKDi. DKD 
then generate the list called session key distribution list 
(SKDL) as shown in Fig 2.  
 
Fig. 2. Session Key Distribution List 
The list has the following new features: 
 It is specific to the AKDi and its rows are in en-
crypted form to securely store the private keys 
SKMi_AKDi corresponding to the number of regis-
tered Mi under AKDi for authentication purpose 
 The AKDi specific rows are also integrity protect-
ed using MAC to prevent replay attacks 
 It include the rows for the target AKDv where the 
Mi will visit and each AKDi can modify its own 
Fig 1 Radiation pattern at yz-plane in the on-on state 
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rows without affecting the rows of its neighbors 
 It securely stores the system security parameters 
initially setup by the DKD which are also dele-
gated securely to the AKDs for group key estab-
lishment 
 It can be used to securely store accounting in-
formation at the cluster level before it is securely 
sent to the SP for further processing.  
We assume that the AKDi-DKD communication link is 
also protected using shared pairwise security association 
key (SAi). The SAi is used by the trusted DKD to securely 
push the SKDLi rows to the corresponding AKDi which 
the AKDi verifies. Finally the AKDi securely retrieve the 
delegated DKD chosen security parameters and Mi de-
rived SKMi_AKDi to proceed with the authentication and 
group key establishment phases without involving the 
DKD hence DKD scalability and no bottlenecks. After the 
system initial setup phase, each cluster AKDi manages the 
service group keys independently without the centralized 
DKD to alleviate 1-affect-n phenomenon [2]. Henceforth, 
every joining Mi is assumed to be tamper proof and re-
ceives AKi at offline prior to joining the network. Mi can 
also subscribe to any service group GK they wish after 
successful registration. 
2.3 Service Group Key distribution  
To provide access control to multi-service groups is 
more complicated than in a single service. Therefore the 
AKDi needs to provide an efficient access control mecha-
nism to manage multi-service groups. After successful 
registration of subscribers, the AKDi generate m×n acces-
sibility matrix (Ai, j) such that: 
 
   
 
where i denote the rows for subscribers in GK (1≤ i ≤ m) 
and j denote the columns for the subscribed service j, (1≤ j 
≤ n).  
The AKDi securely retrieve the delegated chosen se-
curity parameters from the distributed SKDLi to proceed 
with service group keys establishment which are then 
distributed (broadcasted) to the registered Mi. Let the 
service group key share be TEKi,j for encrypting service j 
at cluster i (Ci). The TEKi,j share is shared among the SP 
and Mi ∈ GK subscribed to service j under AKDi. Let KGK 
denote the service group keyset containing the aggregat-
ed group key shares {TEKi,1, TEKi,2,…, TEKi,j} for services 
in GK. Thus subscribers under the same GK would receive 
the aggregated TEKi,j shares for their subscribed services.  
To distribute the TEKi,j shares, the AKDi initially adopt 
the qualified bilinear pair approach described fully in 
[15]. The pair ( ),ik kx x  is said to be a qualified pair if 
= modi ik k kx x x p . 
Proof: 
Let the received prime parameter p be decomposed as: 
na
n
aaa ppppp ...321 321 ++= , where pk and ak are de-
composed primes and integers respectively for 
k=[1,n], pk≠ ip and k≠ki. If k
a
k
i
k px = and
1+∏= ≠
ja
jkjk px , then pair ),(
i
k xx  satisfies to be a 
qualified pair.  
The AKDi can now distribute TEKi,j shares as follows: 
1. Kii GCM ∩∈∀ , AKDi choose m qualified pairs
),( ik xx , 
2. Compute ikk xx ∏= where iK CGm ∩∈ accord-
ing to the accessibility matrix Ai, j, for (1≤ i ≤ m). 
3. Compute the public parameter xP and the pri-
vate key xksIDAKDi Kii GSM   ∩KDL∈∀ and veri-
fy if the received SKMi_AKDi matches the private 
key. 
4. Choose random ∈ρ ॳ	2	and compute 
),ρ(= 1 KGKHr   
5. Broadcast the ciphertext WVU ,, to Ki GM∈∀ as 
6. rAKDG iK sIDxPHKrxP ),(ρ),ρ(⊕, 2 ê  
When Kii GCM   ∩∈∀ receives the ciphertext WVU ,, , it 
can obtain the KGK as follows 
1. Compute ê (U, xksIDAKDi) = ê (rxP, xksIDAKDi) which 
reduces to
rxs
AKD
srxx
AKD i
k
i
IDPIDP ),((=),((  ê ê . 
2. Compute ρ=),((× -rxsAKDiIDPW  ê  . 
3. Compute V ⊕ },...,{==)ρ( ,1,2 jiiG TEKTEKKH K . 
4. Compute ),ρ(= 1
'
KGKHr to verify U. Mi ∈ GK will 
accept 
KGK if UxPr =
' , otherwise deny.  
Note that Mz ∉GK cannot obtain the broadcasted mes-
sage from the AKDi since it is restricted from the qualified 
pair, i.e. xxz ≠ x mod p. Therefore the KGK is delivered to 
the subscribers using qualified pairs of legitimate mem-
bers Mi in GK. Offline Mi ∈ GK can still receive the broad-
casted message anytime during reconnection provided it 
is still a valid subscriber. Most of the computation is 
squeezed into the AKDs with reliable power provision 
and subscribers only perform 4 computations on initial 
service group keys establishment. However during their 
subscription period in the network, they perform fewer 
computations to preserve power consumption. 
2.4 Member handoff with backward secrecy 
During the lifetime of system, subscribers may dy-
namically move between homogeneous/heterogeneous 
clusters. Handover subscribers are considered as leaving 
the old cluster i (Ci) controlled by AKDi followed by join 
at the target cluster v (Cv) controlled by AKDv. This re-
quires backward secrecy [8] to be guaranteed for affected 
services at Cv. Certainly forward secrecy [8] is pointless at 
Ci because subscribers maintain active sessions on 
handoff. We assume the context transfer (CXTP) [16]  and 
media independent handover MIH [17] protocols are al-
ready installed at the AKDs for accelerating handoff. In 
this case a moving subscriber undergoes authentication 
phase on reconnection at the target Cv before the AKDv 
generate and distribute the affected service group keys. 
This implies secure and seamless connectivity on handoff. 
However, both the phases are handled at the cluster level 
without involving the DKD to prevent bottlenecks, rejoin 
and rekeying latencies. Our system adopt a multi-service 




otherwise,0
sserviceaccessMif,1
A nij,i
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slot based rekeying strategy of [18]. The strategy uses key 
update slots (KUS) of size l-bits corresponding to the 
number of services provided by the SP. Each slot can ac-
commodate a maximum of 2l subscribers.  
On handoff, a moving subscriber Mi detects low pow-
er signal strength (Pi) from AKDi and high power signal 
strength (Pv) from the target AKDv, (i.e. Pi ≪ Pv). The Mi 
sends a move_notify message encrypted under its derived 
SKMi_AKDi to the current AKDi. The AKDi authenticates Mi 
∈ GK against its SKMi_AKDi stored in SKDLi. If the Mi de-
rived SKMi_AKDi = DKD derived SKMi_AKDi stored in the 
SKDLi then the AKDi decrypt the notification message 
successfully. The AKDi determines a set of affected ser-
vices subscribed by Mi in GK hence requiring key update. 
The AKDi generate the KUS notifier for the affected ser-
vices to initiate handover process. Both the KUS notifier 
and the Mi SKDLv rows are forwarded to the target AKDv 
via AKDi-AKDv link using CXTP protocol. Note that the 
AKDi deletes the Mi rows in SKDLi after complete 
handoff. The received KUS notifies the AKDv about the 
service keys in KGK requiring key update before Mi ar-
rives. The AKDv initially perform integrity checks on the 
received SKDLv row using MAC before adding it to its 
existing list (SKDLv). Thus AKDv now perform service 
group key update for the affected services progressively 
as follows: 
1. Select a new qualified pair ),( i
i xx for the joining 
Mi ∈ GK. 
2. Compute ),(= i
ii xxx where ikk xx ∏=  
KvOld GC   ∩∈ M∀ v , and set the parameter xiP 
public. 
3. Update the affected service group keys in 
KGK  by 
)(= 3 KK G
i
G KHK , where },...,{= ,1,
i
jv
i
v
i
G TEKTEKK K . 
4. Wait until Mi join notification message is re-
ceived. 
Whenever Mi detects the IDAKDv from the AKDv strong 
signal coverage, the following steps occur progressively: 
1. Mi derives the private key SKMi_AKDv specific to 
the target Cv as sIDAKDv. KDF such as SHA1[19] 
can be used for deriving the private key. 
2. Mi automatically deletes the stored service group 
keys in KGK and the private SKMi_AKDi previously 
used at Ci. This actually creates space for accom-
modating the security keys in Cv. 
3. Send a move_notify message encrypted under 
the derived SKMi_AKDv to AKDv. 
4. AKDv verify the derived SKMi_AKDv by comparing 
it with the stored SKMi_AKDv ∈ SKDLv then decrypt 
the message if they match otherwise deny Mi into 
Cv. 
5. AKDv retrieve the service group keys in KGK sub-
scribed by the Mi then distribute the updated 
version iGKK  to the Mi ∈ GK including Mv ∈ GK. 
6. The AKDv also send the KUS notifier to the 
DKD/SP encrypted under SAv for updating the 
affected services keys after Tupdate. 
However the updated service group key versions in
i
GKK can be distributed to the subscribers using either 
pairwise or LKH rekeying approaches at the cluster level:  
In pairwise rekeying approach [20], all the subscribers in 
GK share common set of TEKv,j shares. Whenever Mi re-
connect at the target Cv, the AKDv multicast the new TEKv, 
j shares in iGKK for the affected services (encrypted with 
the old TEKv, j in KGK) to the existing members Mv ∈ Cv and 
unicast the new TEKv, j shares in iGKK  along with the xi-
sIDAKDv to the new joining Mi ∈ Cv∩ Ci from Ci encrypted 
by Mi derived secret key (SKMi_AKDv). Thus rekeying over-
head (ROT) at the target cluster v when Mi joins Cv gives 
two messages to ensure backward secrecy. However for 
N subscribers joining Cv with backward secrecy while 
participating in S services gives ROT of O(N)+S. 
In LKH rekeying approach [5], a full balanced key 
graph tree of degree d is used to approximate the rekey-
ing overhead at any time. For join operation at the target 
Cv, the AKDv where the join occurs update each key that 
is on the path from the leaf that represents the secret 
key/individual key associated to the new joining Mi to 
the root of the tree which denotes the TEKv,j share. Conse-
quently, each key from the leaf of the new member to the 
root is transmitted twice, i.e. transmitted to the new join-
ing Mi through unicast encrypted under the child key 
known to the new Mi, and via multicast to the members 
that share the node encrypted under its old version. Thus, 
the rekeying messages using the LKH with branching 
factor d under cluster v gives O (logd(N))+S. 
The rekeying process of the multi-service group sys-
tem is pictorially presented in [12]. It is important to note 
that the qualiﬁed pair selection for subscribers is main-
tained by the AKDs until subscriber Mi is revoked or 
handoff to another Cv. Subscribers Mi are restricted from 
accessing the service keys when it re-joins at each cluster 
if the private key (SKMi_AKDi) is invalid. Forward secrecy is 
not necessary because Mi deletes the security keys used in 
the previously visited clusters and Mi maintains its ser-
vices on move. 
3 PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS       
This section analyses our scheme in terms performance 
and security. In addition to our rekeying transmission 
overhead at the core network discussed in [12], the per-
formance is also analyzed through numerical and simula-
tion analyses in terms of rekeying communication over-
heads and memory consumption requirements in the in-
troduced SKDL concept introduced. Finally the security 
analysis considers all types impossible attacks in our sys-
tem with regard to the introduced SKDL. 
3.1 Rekeying Communication Overhead  
This overhead corresponds to the expected amount of 
rekeying messages from unicast or multicast transmis-
sions at the cluster level when N-subscribers perform 
handoff while maintaining S-active multicast sessions. 
Table 1 and 2 compares the communication overheads of 
our scheme with the existing work for the two rekeying 
approaches (pairwise and LKH) discussed in section 2.4 
respectively. Simulation was carried out for the corre-
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sponding rekeying approaches in Fig. 2a) and b) to com-
pare the rekeying communication overheads of the con-
cerned schemes. The simulation parameters used include 
N=n= 1 and 10 for S=7 services.  
It can clearly be seen that BR induces high number of 
rekeying signalling messages than others because the ser-
vice keys and local area keys are updated independently 
in both clusters on member handoff. The IR reduces the 
need to rekey service keys but triggers local area key re-
key only in both clusters. To further reduce communica-
tion overheads from IR, both the GKMF [8] and Kellil et al 
[9] schemes adopt DR [7] strategy by introducing the use 
of mobility list as to record handover members such that 
the previous Ci induces null rekeying overhead on Mi 
handoff. 
TABLE 1 
PAIRWISE REKEYING APPROACH COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS 
 
TABLE 2 
LKH REKEYING APPROACH COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS 
 
 
This actually improves the bandwidth efficiency of the 
system while satisfying the backward secrecy requirement 
of services at the target Cv. However the rekeying commu-
nication overhead is reduced at the expense of storage 
complexity at the resource constraint mobile receiver as 
discussed in [12]. Thus a handover subscriber need to 
maintain the local area keys for the previously visited 
clusters to reduce the need for rekeying on return period 
provided no rekey has occurred on Mi. However whenever 
the high mobility subscribers decide to leave after visiting 
multiple clusters rekeying is triggered in all the previously 
visited clusters hence inducing significant communication 
overheads hence enormous bandwidth usage due to re-
peated rekeying. Since data transmission cannot resume 
until all visited clusters have been rekeyed with new ser-
vice keys. Thus FEDRP, GKMF and Kellil et al stay offline 
longer than SMGKM. In this case for N multiple handoffs 
participating in S services; conventional protocols incur 
huge communication overhead and huge delays in obtain-
ing the services.  If the service key shares require key up-
date, the rekeying overhead in conventional approaches 
becomes substantial due to 1-affect-n phenomenon. There-
fore adopting independent service group keys per cluster is 
the ultimate solution to reduce rekeying overheads hence 
delays since rekeying gets localized. Additionally the SKDL 
concept introduced also prevents repeated rekeying caused 
by frequent handoffs which finally leave after visiting 
multiple clusters. 
 
 
a) Using Pairwise rekeying approach  
 
b) Using Pairiwise rekeying approach 
Fig.3 Rekeyin communication overheads 
 
3.2 SKDL Memory Consumption Requirement    
The SKDL storage capacity in the AKD is determined 
by the number of Mi the AKDi is currently serving and 
number of rows for the target AKDv the Mi will visit. The 
format of the SKDL can be determined by the size of the 
MAC, SKMi_AKDi and the IDAKDi. Assuming that the SKDL 
uses common initialization vector (IV) with non-repeating 
values in rows for semantic security and assuming en-
cryption and security parameters does not supplement to 
the SKDL size. Therefore total SKDL storage requirement 
can be computed as 
Memory
iSKDL =sf (IV) +A*SKMi_AKDi*Mi*(sf (SKMi_AKDi) + sf (IDAKDi)) 
where MemoryiSKDL  denote the storage capacity of the 
SKDL in bytes; A denote the maximum number of SKDL 
rows which is usually equivalent to the number of Mi 
under AKDi; sf() denote the function returning the size in 
bits of the parameter in brackets. Now specifying 
SMGKM to utilize the parameters, MAC (e.g SHA1)=160 
bits, AES Key (SKMi_AKDi) = 128 bits, IDAKDi for IPv4 and 
IPv6 networks= 32 bits and 128 bits respectively. It can be 
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deduced that one SKDL row size requires 40 bytes and 52 
bytes for the network supporting IPv4 and IPv6 respec-
tively.  
The SKDL with 28 AKDs would require storage of 
1120 bytes and 1456 bytes for IPv4 and IPv6 network re-
spectively which is < 1500 bytes packet of the largest al-
lowed Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) by Ether-
netv2 at the network layer without fragmentation [21]. 
The AKDi supporting IPv4 and IPv6 addresses with 50 
keys and 25 Mi under it will occupy a total memory of 
50kB and 65kB respectively for SKDL only. Thus the 
SKDL perspective is more applicable for distributing the 
SKMi_AKDi synchronously to the specific AKDs especially in 
congested areas like the city center where the AKDs and 
Mi are considerable huge in number without key request 
from the DKD for authentication and key distribution. 
Therefore this optimizes the signalling load between the 
AKD and DKD and authentication delays in the convec-
tional schemes. As shown in Fig. 4, if SMGKM support 
IPv6 enabled network, this would increase SKDL memory 
consumption by 30% than IPv4 network due to its lengthy 
address.  
 
However the SKDL with SKMi_AKDi keys for 400 target 
AKDs would need memory of about 16kB per Mi for IPv4 
and 20.4kB per Mi for IPv6. The AKDs are only interested 
in obtaining their rows equivalent to the number of Mi 
they are currently serving. Since increasing the memory 
requirement in the AKD reduces signaling load due to 
key request from the DKD hence DKD scalability. Con-
clusively SKDL proposal is a signaling optimizer of the 
conventional key request schemes (DeCleene et al, GKMF 
and Kellil et al). Thus our scheme scales better when more 
target AKDs are included in the SKDL rows assuming the 
mobility pattern of the Mi and network conditions re-
mains stable.   
3.2 Security Analysis   
The service group key distribution in our scheme uses 
identity based encryption which is secure against outside 
probabilistic polynomial time attacks. Thus to get the updat-
ed KGK from the broadcasted ciphertext <U, V, W>, the 
outside adversaries must compute ⍴ without the secret 
key of the AKDi. Due to cryptographically independent 
keys per cluster key compromises within the cluster get 
localized in our scheme. Eavesdropping opportunities are 
impossible in our system because backward secrecy re-
quirement is achieved by updating the affected service 
keys in KGK which are delivered to valid subscribers using 
their qualified pairs by the AKDi. Thus the reconnecting 
subscriber cannot discover the preceding service group 
key shares in KGK before it joins due to the one-way prop-
erty of H3. Impersonation attacks are also intolerable due to 
mutual authentication between Mi and the AKDi on every 
handoff. Each member is verified against the already 
DKD derived SKMi_AKDi in the SKDLi before accessing the 
fresh versions of the service group keys using the secret 
key SKMi_AKDi which is bonded to the specific AKDi identi-
ty. Thus with mutual authentication over the air interface, 
Mi can check if a network can be trusted before entering 
hence preventing denial of service attacks (DoS). The 
AKDi cannot forge to be legitimate because it is not aware 
of the Mi public key AKi. It only receives the already de-
rived SKMi_AKDi for Mi via secure SKDLi rows from the 
trusted DKD which it uses to mutually authenticate the 
subscribers at joining. The security parameters for deriv-
ing the service keys are also securely stored and delivered 
through the SKDLi. The SKDLi rows are kept in encrypted 
form and integrity protected using MAC to prevent any 
replay attacks. Encryption/decryption operations of the 
SKDLi rows are specific to the AKDi to prevent contributo-
ry attacks. If the introduced SKDLi is implemented in an 
external secure hardware chip like the trusted module, it 
will be practically more infeasible for the adversary to 
obtain the SKMi_AKDi by just examining the SKDLi rows 
between the AKDi-AKDi links. The SKDLi concept also 
inhibits location based attacks and redirection attacks are also 
impossible due to the encrypted rows by the trusted 
DKD. Physical node capture attacks are impossible because 
the subscribers are assumed to be tamper proof and the 
adversary cannot derive the private key SKMi_AKDi without 
prior knowledge of the AKi. 
4 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we presented a new decentralized multi-
service GKM scheme for managing service group keys 
independently. The trusted DKD securely delegated the 
authentication and the key management security parame-
ters to the intermediate trusted AKDs during initial regis-
tration setup using secure SKDL concept. The key distri-
bution phase during rekeying on handoff was offloaded 
to the AKD level after successfully authenticating sub-
scribers who dynamically change point of attachment to 
the network domains. This has massively reduced per-
formance hurdles such as authentication delays, 1-affect-n 
phenomenon in the entire network and single point of 
failures faced by the DKD in the conventional schemes. 
The performance evaluation and simulation results 
showed that our scheme is adaptive to multi-services and 
outperforms the existing schemes in terms of communica-
tion overheads while providing resilience to various at-
tacks. The SKDL concept introduced was found to be very 
useful for accelerating handoff and provided DKD scala-
bility. The concept can be more applicable in congested 
mobile environments like the city center where multiple 
Fig. 4. SKDL memory consumption with increasing AKDs 
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handoffs may occur with reduced rekeying transmissions 
over the core network. Thus SMGKM can be used for se-
curely transmitting several applications with different 
access privileges in the same network with less band-
width requirement hence benefiting the future generation 
of communication technologies. 
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